

Philosophy Preliminary Exam Syllabus
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Traditionally (as in Kolmogorov), probability theory has been seen as a way to assign weights to propositions in classical logic. However, some (like Field, Popper, and van Fraassen) have at times seen it as a way to justify classical logic, while others (like Weatherson, Zadeh, and Hugues & LeBlanc) have argued that we should actually use a different underlying logic. Meanwhile, others (like Hajek, Goosens, and Popper) have argued that conditional probability should be the notion on which probability theory is based, rather than unconditional probability. These three debates cross-cut one another and question just what the role is that probability should play in our reasoning, and what its relation should be to logic.

Reading List

Field, Hartry "Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role" 1977

Goosens, William K. "Alternative Axiomatizations of Elementary Probability Theory" 1975

Hajek, Alan "What Conditional Probability Could Not Be" 2003

Kolmogorov, A.N. "Foundations of the Theory of Probability" 1950/1933

Popper, Karl "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" appendices *iv and *v
1959 or 1968

Roeper, Peter and Hugues Leblanc *Probability Theory and Probability Semantics* 1999

van Fraassen, Bas "Probabilistic Semantics I" 1981

Weatherson, Brian "From Classical to Intuitionist Probability" 2004

Zadeh, Lotfi "Probability Measures of Fuzzy Events" 1968